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The Airland Battle is an emerging doctrine of the US Army. This doctrine
envisions an extended battlefield, not confined to a narrow belt around the
forward edge of the (main) battle area (FEBA). Inherent in this doctrine is a
concept of target value analysis which attempts to identify targets on the
extended battlefield in terms of their values, which may be situationally
dependent. Such analysis is crucial to the successful conduct of the Airland
Battle, since the battlefield environment is target rich, but asset limited, and
therefore these limited assets must be allocated to maximize effectiveness.
A group of faculty and students at NPS is currently involved in research
whose goal is the development of methodologies appropriate for modelling
Corps-level combat under this still-emerging doctrine. The essential goals of this
project, which is titled the Airland Research Model, are the development of:
a. A two-sided, force-on-force model at the Blue Corps, Red
Front level.
b. A primarily systemic (no human intervention) decision
architecture, but with the provision to selectively insert human
decision-makers if required for the development of rule-based
systems.
c. A generalized network methodology and multidimensional
coordinate system to represent transportation systems, terrain,
communication links, and both fixed and mobile combat assets.
d. A resolution determined by the function and situation
being modeled.
e. An ability to represent planning based on future-time
extrapolation of the possible results of plan execution.
f. Detailed audit trails of cause/effect relationships between
decisions made and the results of decision executions.
The primary focus of model development to date has been on command
and control (C2)/decisionmaking methodology, since the pivotal element of any
closed (no man-in-the-loop) combat model is the decision rules used by the
simulated elements. One of the major general thrusts of our research revolves
about degree to which such decisions can be represented as quantitative, multi-
attribute optimizations, as opposed to representation in terms of expert
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systems/artificial intelligence/heuristic processes. This question is especially
relevant for decisions that involve force allocations or task, prioritizations. Such
decisions are extremely complex, and current models often contain very ad-hoc
schemes that seem to compare "apples and oranges."
We envision that, in the Airland Research Model, the starting point for
any combat decision process will be the unit mission, expressed in terms of a
desired future network state or sequence of future states, and a list of which
enemy units must be fought. Each command headquarters will need to
dynamically generate missions for each of its subordinate units in the hierarchy,
and this mission generation process must establish both a desired end state and
an associated time frame for each subordinate. (The modelling of this dynamic
mission generation process will be one of the most critical (and difficult)
research areas of the project.) As part of this overall process, command
headquarters will also need to generate schemes of maneuver and force
allocations against dynamically generated enemy avenues of approach. A
planning filter (or filters), based on the area of interest and area of influence,
will need to be available to identify all enemy units and assets that can affect
the mission. Lastly, algorithms must be developed that produce rank-orderings
and target priority lists for enemy units and assets; and that allocate maneuver,
fire support, interdiction and other assets against the targets on the list.
This note is concerned with a fundamental aspect of the development of
these rank-ordering and target list-producing algorithms, specifically whether a
feasible mechanism exists for producing such lists by a quantitative
optimization, as opposed to by the expert systems approach. At the heart of
such a quantitative optimization algorithm would, of necessity, lie a Generalized
Value System (GVS), i.e. a system capable of assigning a "value" to each
candidate target for the list. Determining generalized value for the Airland
battle is not a trivial procedure, for several reasons:
a. The Airland Battlefield consists of greatly dissimilar
targets, e.g. combat units, logistical depots, bridges, etc.
b. There do not exist acceptable value systems for other than
combat and fire support units (and even these are subject to
debate).
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c. Interdiction warfare is based on a concept of threat
stemming from potential for future usage, as opposed to current
killing ability.
This report proposes an axiomatic generalized value system for the Airland
Research Model and then examines the feasibility of the proposed system. The
advantage of an axiomatic system is that the values of all potential targets are
derivable from some basic set of principles. Therefore ad-hoc assignments are
unnecessary, and comparisons between unlike systems are consistent. The values
provided by this proposed axiomatic value system would then form the basis for
target allocation decisions. We would emphasize that, at this time, we are not
proposing the decision logic to allocate weapons to targets, only a mechanism by
which a common value system can be applied to a proposed target list, after
which the allocation procedure can then be logically applied.
2. FUNDAMENTAL CONCEPTS
The development of the axiomatic value system begins with several
fundamental premises, which are really the assumptions which underlie the
entire proposal. The first major premise is that:
The purpose of an army is to wage war, and therefore the
only elements/units that have inherent value are fighting elements,
i.e. maneuver and fire support.
Before the reader is tempted to lay this report aside as a return to the dark
ages of combat modeling, where only fighters were modeled, it is important to
understand that this does NOT mean than combat support and combat service
support units have NO value. For the second major premise in our system is:
The value of CS/CSS units derives totally from the increase
or decrease in value they provide to the combat (inherent value)
units they support.
Thus, under our concept, while ammunition storage and transport units may
have value, an army made of solely of ammunition storage and transport units
is of no value. (The reader may wish to reflect on this comment.) Of course,
these conceptual statements yield no information on how this derived value can
be calculated. We shall consider this latter question in subsequent sections.
Lastly, we would point out that the value of combat units in contact stems
primarily from their ability to destroy opposing forces. In contrast, the value of
units which are not in contact, or of logistics support in the pipeline, derives
from the potential for usage at some time in the future. (Consider of what value
a reserve would be if the commander involved had decided that, under no
circumstances he would commit that force.) Thus, we shall adopt as our final
major premise the view that:
Uncommitted units and usable, but unused, support are
analogous to financial assets which mature at some time in the
future - that is their current value is a discounted version of their
nominal (inherent or derived) value.
This approach has several factors to recommend it, not the least of which are
that discounting of future assets is a well recognized and accepted procedure,
and that normal discounting, i.e. by a fixed percentage per time period,
corresponds to exponential decay of value, an almost trivial computation in a
model.
3. PRINCIPLE DEFINITIONS AND TERMS
In this section we introduce the main terminology with which we shall
discuss our value system. As we noted above, we presume that value must, in
the final analysis, relate to combat ability. This motivates our first definition:
Basic Inherent Value is that value possessed by a maneuver or
fire support unit, in contact, as a direct result of the unit's ability
to conduct combat operations.
We shall assume that this quantity can be computed for any given combat unit,
since our intent in this report is to propose a methodology by which the values
of all other entities on the battlefield can be derived from the basic inherent
values of combat units. We recognize that a major research effort remains in
agreeing upon the algorithms for computing basic inherent value, however,
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addressing that question in more than a cursory way is beyond our scope.
However, whatever algorithms are finally decided upon for this computation,
the value will depend on what we refer to as the state of the unit. This state is,
at present, a somewhat fuzzy, multidimensional quantity, which we assume will
depend, as a minimum, upon the:
(a) Number of operational weapon systems,
(b) Effective personnel strength,
(c) Available ammunition, and
(d) Available POL
of the unit being considered. (Note that inherent value is very similar to an
index of firepower potential (IFP) or firepower score.) We shall hereafter denote
the state of a unit and the associated value, at time t, by s(t) and V(s(t)),
respectively. (Bold face type is used here to signify a potentially
multidimensional quantity.)
Immediately following the definition of basic inherent value, we also have
have the following definition:
Basic Derived Value is that value possessed by a CS/CSS unit
because of it's ability to either increase or maintain the value of a
combat unit. This value is computed as if the support were able to
be provided instantaneously when required.
Thus, if we were to denote the state of the supported unit, without the
CS/CSS support as Sj(t), and with support as S2(t), then the basic derived value
of the CS/CSS unit would simply be
V(s2(t))-V(Sl (t))
(Mechanisms by which these can be computed will be discussed later.) Observe
that basic inherent value is defined for units in contact with the enemy, and
basic derived value as if the supporting unit were colocated with the combat
unit. Neither need be the case. Thus, we add the following definition:
The Situationally Dependent Value of a unit is its basic value,
either inherent or derived, decremented by an exponential factor
based on the time interval before that unit is available for
commitment or can provide support.
Thus a unit which would have a basic (either inherent or derived) value of
V(s(tQ) if it were available at time tg, but which will not be available until some
time t > tg, will have the situationally dependent value at time tg of:
V = V(s(t )) e-A(M0)
While this formulation does require a determination of the time/decay
constant (A), we propose that this is not a major obstacle. For inherent in the
Airland battle doctrine is the concept of the Area of Interest - that area, at each
echelon, in which the commander focuses his intelligence collection assets to
acquire targets and determine enemy capabilities and intentions. Furthermore,
this area of interest is expressable in terms of both distance and time, e.g. a
division commander's area of interest may be nominally on the order of thirty-
six hours. Thus, this division would look to acquire targets thirty-six hours
before they reach the FLOT. Our final premise is that this leads to an extremely
simple algorithm for determining the decay constant, i.e. chose the decay
constant so that a unit entering the area of interest at the maximum distance
(time) from the FLOT has only negligible value, e.g. 10%. Thus the discount
figure for division-level targets would be determined from the equation:
exp(-36*A) = 0.10, or A = .063/hour .
Under this approach then, a target maneuver unit located twelve hours from the
FLOT would have a situationally dependent value of 46% (exp(-0.063*12)) of
its inherent value, while a maneuver unit only six hours from the FLOT would
have a situationally dependent value of 68% of its inherent value.
4. INSTANTANEOUS VERSUS AVERAGED VALUE
We would now note that value, as we have discussed it thus far, is a
function solely of the state of the units involved at a single time (t), i.e. it is an
instantaneous value. For certain analyses, this is certainly the most important
single measure. For example, in trying to determine the probability of success of
a breakthrough attack against a fairly shallow defense, the single most
important measure would seem to be the relative combat power (value) of the
units at the FEBA. However, we also note that the state of committed units is
not constant, but changes continually (due to attrition, expenditure of POL and
ammo, etc.). Therefore, for many questions, especially those involving the
probability of success of extended operations, average value may be more
meaningful measure. In order to remain consistent with our concept of
exponential future discounting, we would then propose the following as the
measure of average value:
ga(v) = A / V (§(t)) e"At dt '
where the current time is t = 0. (The decay factor A in front of this integral is
for normalization purposes, i.e. so that if V(s(t)) is constant, then
GA(V) = V ,
and, if A - °°
,
then
GA(V) = V(0) ,
i.e. if the dimension of the area of interest shrinks to zero, the average value
reduces the current instantaneous value. We would also note that, if A is
derived as discussed above from the area of interest, that the portion of the
integral from times beyond the area of interest should be negligible.)
5. DERIVING VALUES FOR LOGISTICAL UNITS
As discussed above, the values of CS/CSS units derive from their effects on
the values of the units they support. In this section, we present some initial
thoughts on algorithms for computing values for logistical units. While not
covering all cases, these nevertheless represent the type of algorithms that will be
necessary for computing values for noncombat (i.e. CS/CSS) units. Logistical
units are the easiest of the CS/CSS units to value since the functions of logistics
in combat can be interpreted as a network of reservoirs (supply dumps) and
pipes (transportation assets) whose function is to deliver a certain flow rate to
the units in contact. Key parameters are the capacities of the reservoirs and
pipes. The main purpose of the reservoirs is to function as shock absorbers in
the face of fluctuating demands and replenishment rates, and in view of limited
transportation capacity.
We first observe that, in the absence of logistical support, the value of
combat units, even when not in contact, decreases monotonically over time. This
decay, which is depicted in Figure 1, is due to the consumption of supplies, the




wearout of equipment, and the nonbattle attrition of personnel. The use of the
term decay is deliberate, since we expect that, at least to a first approximation,
this decrease in value could be modeled either by:
V(s(t)) = V e"bt , or V(s(t)) = VQ e"
bt '
where the value of b would depend on the unit's mission, environment, etc. A
fundamental assumption in our approach is that the consumption, etc., that
causes the change in state which leads to this decay can be estimated for a
variety of conditions. This, of course, is really little more than assuming the
validity of consumption factors such as are found in FM 101-10-1.
Logistical units act to change this decay in one of two general ways:
1. When the logistical unit is colocated with the supported
unit, so that the support is immediately available, the effect will be
to either raise the basic curve or decrease the slope of the decay, or
both. This is indicated in Figure 2a (In theory, if the logistical
unit had infinite support capacity, the decay curve would become
flat.)
2. When the logistical unit is not colocated, then the support
arrives at some time in the future. This will cause a discrete jump
in.the value of the supported unit at that time, following which the
value will again decay until further support is received, etc. This
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Figure 2
Lastly, note that for logistical units, the average value, G a , is essentially
an exponentially weighted average of the area between the two respective curves
in Figure 2.
Thus far, our approach has viewed logistics as a homogenous mixture
provided to the users. This, of course, is not really realistic. Ammunition, for
example, is provided in a somewhat different manner than POL, and the effect
of ammunition resupply on a unit's value need not be the same as the effect of
POL resupply. In addition, since the Airland model need not assume either side
knows full ground truth on the other, we must also have procedures to assign
value to a known logistical asset in the absence of knowledge about the location
or condition of other assets. Thus we need to create an algorithm for
determining the value of one specific type of logistic support, in the absence of
full specific information on the other types. To do this, we introduce the concept
of the (logistics) state network.
The logistics state network is related to ideas of state transitions, although
the changes involved need to be random. Specifically, we assume that the state
of a unit is given by an n-dimensional vector, and consider the possible changes
that alter the unit's state from
Sj = ( ap a2 , . . . , an )
to
S2 - (b lt b2 , ...,bn ) .
This transition will alter the value of the unit. The following methodology then
determines how much of this change to ascribe to the change from aj to bj,
from &2 t0 °2> etc -
The process begins by establishing a network of nodes and arcs, where the
nodes are generated sequentially from the initial node Sj. The immediate
neighbors of this node correspond to those states that are reachable by changing
precisely one of the a^ to the corresponding b:. The next level is generated by
those states that represent replacement of precisely two of the a^'s, etc. Nodes
are connected by an arc if and only if the corresponding states differ in precisely
one position. The process continues until S2 is reached. A sample network for a
three dimensional state vector is shown in Figure 3.
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Figure 3
Note that every node at the i™ level (where i = corresponds to Sj)
generates precisely (n-i) arcs to the next level, that there will be exactly n!
different paths from S^ to S2, and, that, for each component of the state vector,
only one arc on each path will represent changes due to that component. Each
node represents some intermediate state between Sj to S2, with a corresponding
value somewhere between V(S|) and V^). The value assigned to any arc will
be the difference between the values of the end nodes for that arc. Then, we can
compute the value of each component as the average of the values along all arcs
of paths corresponding to a change of that component. (Note this will require
multiple counting of arcs that occur on more than one path.) A sample complete
such network is displayed in Figure 4, with the values of each of the nodes
(arcs) written above that node (arc). For this network, using the methodology
just described, the portions of the total increase in value:
V(S2(t))-V(S 1 (t)) = 300
due to each of the three components of the state vector would be:
First Type: (2(150) + (150 + 75) + 2(50) )/6 = 104
Second Type: (2(50) + (50 + 150) + 2(125) )/6 = 92




In closing this section, we note that, if desired, the above simple average
could be replaced by a weighted average in the presence of additional
information about the probability of certain intermediate states being actually
reached, e.g. if a known POL shortage exists.
6. EXAMPLES
We conclude by presenting two examples of the use of the proposed value
system methodology. Consider the attacking forces shown in Figure 5, which we
assume have the following basic inherent values at full strength (in all areas)
when in contact:
Motorized Rifle Battalion (+) 350
Motorized Rifle Battalion 250
Tank Battalion 400















The forward two motorized rifle battalions and the artillery battalion are
committed, while the two second echelon battalions are a minimum of 1.5 hours
from commitment. Further, we assume for simplicity that maneuver units lose
30% of their value per hour committed, while artillery units lose 15% of their
value per hour committed. (In this scenario, reconstitution, repair, and rcsupply
are not considered.) Lastly, we assume that the defending task force commander
has a three hour area of interest (which equates to a decay constant of 0.77).
Thus, the current situationally dependent value of all the units shown is:
Vn = ( 350 + 350 + 600 ) + ( 250 + 300 J*^-
77)* 1 -5
= 1300 + 550*e' 1.16
= 1472
We now suppose the defending task force commander has available an asset
(e.g. an on call air strike) with the capability to cause one of the following:
a. 50% decrease in the basic inherent value of a committed
maneuver battalion
b. 35% decrease in the basic inherent value of a committed
artillery battalion
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c. 40% decrease in basic inherent value plus one hour delay
(due to confusion, etc.) to one uncommitted maneuver battalion
d. 0% decrease in basic inherent value plus two hour delay
(due to road damage) to both uncommitted maneuver battalions
The immediate values associated with these various options are, respectively,
Option a: 175 = ( 350*.50)
Option b: 210 = ( 600*.35)
Option c: 68 = ( 300*e_M6 - (300*.60)*e"(-77)* 2 ' 5 )
Option d: 135 = ( 550*e
_1
- 16
- 550*e-(-77)* 3 -5 )
Therefore, if the sole criteria for allocating this asset were to produce the
maximum immediate decrease in value, the best choice would be to attack the
opposing artillery battalion. However, other criteria may be equally
appropriate. For example, suppose the objective were to minimize the average
value of the total opposing force over the interval in question. If the attacking
force were to commit its second echelon forces as soon as possible, then, over
time (assuming t = to be the time in Figure 5), the value of the attacking force
(without the air strike) would obey the formula:
V(t) : f700*e"-36t + 600*e"- 16t + 550*e"-77
*( L5 " t)
,
0<t<1.5
700 * e-.36t + 600*e"' 16t + 550*e"-36 *( t_1 - 5 )
,
1.5 <t
Formulas for the value of the attacking force under each of the strike options
above can be similarly derived. For the sake of brevity, only the one for the
value under the third option (strike the uncommitted tank battalion) is shown
here:
- 14
V3(t) = f 700*e
_
-36t + 600*e"- 16t + 250*e"-77 *( 1 -5
" t)
+ (300*.6)*e--77 *(2 - 5_t) ,0<t<1.5
700*e"*36t + 600*e"- 16t + 250*e'-36 *(M -5 )
+ (300*.6)*e-J7 *(2 ' 5_t)
,
1 .5 < t < 2.5
700 * e-.36t + 6Q0*e"' I6t + 250*e"-36 *(t
' 1 -5 )
+ (300*.6)*e"-36 *(t_2 -5 ) , 2.5 <t
Using these equations, curves describing the values, over time, of the total
attacking force for these various options were computed and are displayed in
Figure 6. Note that now under the objective of minimizing the average value of
the total opposing force attacking the road network appears to be the best
•option.
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Figure 6
Lastly, however, we note that we expect that decisions in the model may
frequently require computation of more than one set of value curves. For
example, this would be necessary when the decision-making objective has been
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stated in the form of a constrained optimization, e.g. minimize the average value
of the total attacking force, subject to the condition that the value of committed
units never exceeds 1200 during the battle. Figure 7 displays the values, over
time, of only the committed attacking forces, i.e. those actually in contact. Note
the decision rule described above would exclude all the options lying above the
threshold line indicated in Figure 7.























Our second, example illustrates the use of our methodology for logistics. In
this example, we consider an artillery battalion whose basic load of ammunition
would last twenty-seven hours under normal expenditure conditions. We assume
that, over this time, the basic inherent value of the artillery battalion is solely a
function of the ammunition on hand (i.e. no other losses); that the consumption
of ammunition will remain uniform until all onhand ammunition is expended;
and that, as a function of the number of basic loads of ammunition on hand,
the value of the artillery battalion follows the curve shown in Figure 8. (Note
the expression postulated for this curve was:
V = 300*(1.5- 1.4*e" L03
* B
)
where B was the number of basic loads of ammunition on hand.)
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VALUE AS FUNCTION OF AMMO
1.0 l.S 2.0
BASIC LOADS ON HAND
Figure 8
We now assume that at t = the battalion has on hand one basic load of
ammunition, and consider the value of an ammunition resupply equal to a
second basic load. Figure 9 displays two curves for the value of the battalion as
a function of time. The lower curve is the value without delivery of the resupply,
while the upper curve is the value with the resupply on hand. Thus, at any time,
the basic derived value of the ammunition resupply is simply the difference
between the upper and lower curves.









Following the same procedure as with combat units, the situationally
dependent value of the resupply ammunition is determined by exponential
discounting of the basic derived value based on the difference between the
current time and the time when the resupply would actually arrive. The
resulting curves are shown in Figure 10 for the case where the resupply is
expected at t = 12 hours and the area of interest corresponds to 36 hours. As
expected, the basic value of the ammunition grows as the battalion expends its
on-hand ammunition. Furthermore, the situationally dependent value also
increases, although for early times the exponential discounting will clearly affect
this value.
VALUE OF AMMUNITION RESUPPLY
TIME (HOURS)
Figure 10
Lastly, Figure 1 1 shows the effect of interdiction on value, by displaying
the situationally dependent values of the ammunition for resupply at both t= 12
and t= 18 hours. At any time, the value of the additional six hours delay is just
the difference between the two curves. (Note there is no value assigned to
interdiction for time greater than 12 hours since if the ammunition is not
interdicted by then, it will have been delivered.)
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In this paper we have proposed and developed a structure for assigning
value, consistently, to the varied and diverse targets that populate the Airland
battlefield. The values thus assigned are intended to be used as inputs to various
target selection and weapon allocation decision modules in a Corps-level Airland
Research Model under development at NPS. The key elements of the proposed
value structure are that the values of noncombatant targets must be derived
from the values of combatant targets that are supported, and that the value of
time is reflected in the use of exponential discounting of value. A great deal of
research still needs to be done to incorporate and refine this structure.
Specifically, as alluded to in the paper, while the actual decisionmaking
processes in the Airland Research Model will likely take the form of constrained
optimizations, the actual form of the rules to be used is, for most decisions, not
currently defined. Also, the value system we have proposed depends on realistic
algorithms for computing what we have defined as the basic inherent values of
combat units based on what we have called their state. Additional effort
remains in the development of these algorithms. Despite the research still
required, the structure proposed in this paper offers significant promise of being
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